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Recent Case Law on 
Maryland's Speedy Trial Rule 
In 1979, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held the application of Maryland 
Rule 746, now Maryland Rule 4-271, is 
mandatory and that the sanction for fail-
ure to comply with this l8O-day rule is 
dismissal of the charges with prejudice. 1 
Since that time, there has been a plethora 
of litigation concerning the interpreta-
tion of the Rule and the applicability of 
the dismissal sanction? 
Maryland Rule 4-271 requires that, in 
circuit court, a trial date must be set 
within thirty days after either the appear-
ance of counsel or the fIrst appearance 
of the defendant before the circuit court, 
whichever occurs fIrst. 3 This trial date 
shall not be later than 1~ days after the 
earlier of these events. If a postpone-
ment causes the trial to be held after 180 
days has passed, the postponement is in 
accordance with the rule only if a party 
or the court sua sponte requests the 
postponement, good cause is shown by 
the moving party, and the county admin-
istrative judge or his or her designee 
approves the postponement of the trial. 5 
The purpose of Rule 4-271 is to pro-
mote orderly procedure by setting a time 
limit for the State to prepare for trial.6 
The Rule seeks to minimize the societal 
effects of excessive delays in the criminal 
justice system? It does not implement 
the accused's sixth amendment right to 
a speedy trial.8 
Sixth amendment case analysis differs 
signifIcantly from the analysis applicable 
to Rule 4-271. The Maryland Rule is ana-
lyzed under principles of statutory con-
struction.9 Sixth amendment speedy trial 
cases are analyzed under the four factor 
balancing test announced by the United 
States Supreme Court in Barker v. 
Wingo. 10 These four factors are: (1) the 
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the 
delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the 
right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant 
because ofthe delay. 11 
Once a case is properly postponed 
beyond the Rule's l8O-day limit, a 
defendant's right to a speedy trial is pro-
tected only by the sixth amendment.12 
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Even if a case is properly postponed 
under Rule 4-271, however, a prosecutor 
must remain diligent in bringing a defen-
dant to trial at the earliest possible date. 
InReedv. State, 13 for example, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
while a postponement beyond the 18(} 
day period had been properly granted, 
and thus the dismissal sanction under the 
Rule was not appropriate, a delay of more 
than thirteen months between the 
defendant's arrest and trial violated his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. His 
conviction was reversed, therefore, even 
though Rule 4-271 had not been violated. 
Running of the ISO-day Clock 
The l8O-day period begins at the ear-
lier of the appearance of counsel or the 
fIrst appearance of the defendant before 
the circuit court.14 The l8O-day period, 
however, does not apply to cases 
brought in the district court.15 Thus, 
when a defendant is fIrst charged in the 
district court but later indicted in the 
circuit court, the time spent in the dis-
trict couf is not included in the l8O-day 
period. 1 Moreover, if a case is trans-
ferred from the district court because of 
a demand for jury trial, and the appear-
ance of counsel was entered in the dis-
trict court, the l8O-day period begins on 
the date the case was docketed in the 
circuit court. 17 
Although the Rule seems to be clear 
regarding when the 180-day period be-
gins, there have been a number of 
cases that have litigated this issue. In 
McCallum v. State,18 the defendant 
was convicted of various violations of 
the Transportation Article of the Mary-
land Code. A preliminary hearing was 
scheduled for March 28, 1988. At that 
time, the defendant was serving a six 
month sentence in the Anne Arundel 
County Detention Center and, for rea-
sons not explained, the defendant was 
not transported to the hearing.19 The 
hearing was postponed and no further 
action was taken until counsel entered 
his appearance on May 6, 1988.20 If the 
l8O-day period began on the date the 
preliminary hearing was scheduled, Rule 
4-271 was violated and the charges 
would be dismissed.21 The court of spe-
cial appeals held to the contrary. The 
18O-day period begins when counsel en-
ters an appearance or the defendant fIrst 
appears before the circuit court. In this 
case, because no preliminary hearing 
was ever conducted, counsel's ~pear­
ance started the l8O-day clock. The 
court stated that it was irrelevant that the 
State, by its negligence, may have caused 
the preliminary hearing to be post-
poned.23 
In Grandison v. State,24 the court of 
appeals held that when a case is removed 
at the defendant's request, the 18O-day 
period begins to run anew in the receiv-
ing court from the time the case is re-
ceived.25 In this case, the defendant 
requested that the case be removed to 
the Circuit Court for Somerset County 
less than one month before the 18O-day 
period expired in ~e Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County.2 The court of appeals 
noted that the major safeguard of Rule 
4-271 is that a case may only be post-
poned by an administrative judge or his 
or her designee, as such persons have an 
overall view of the court's business?7 
The court concluded that the Rule was 
not designed to cover situations of re-
moval because the administrative judge 
of the court from which the case was 
removed would be unable to fulfill the 
functions contemplated by the Rule.28 
Moreover, to require the receiving court 
to adhere to the trial schedule set by the 
forwarding court would impose an un-
reasonable and often impossible task 
upon the administrative judge of the re-
ceiving court.29 The court held, there-
fore, that when a case is removed at the 
defendant's request, the trial date set in 
the original court in accordance with 
Rule 4-271 is no longer relevant and the 
l8O-day period begins anew in the receiv-
ing court.30 Additionally, the court stated 
in dictum that the same principle applies 
if removal is granted at the request of the 
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StateY If it appears, however, that the 
State's request was for the purpose of, or 
had the necessary effect of, circumvent-
ing the Rule, the original trial date will 
control for purposes of Rule 4-271.32 
The Grandison holding is consistent 
with the ruling of the court of appeals in 
Curly v. State.33 In that case, the court 
held that when a criminal case in the 
circuit court is nol prossed and the State 
later reflies the same charges, the 18().day 
period begins with the arraignment or 
first appearance of counsel in the second 
prosecution.34 If it is shown, however, 
that the nol pros had the purpose or 
effect of circumventing the Rule, the 180-
day period begins with the arraignment 
or first appearance of counsel in the first 
prosecution.35 
The Role of the Adntinistrative 
Judge 
Maryland courts have consistently 
held that every postponement must be 
granted by an admJnistrative judge or his 
or her designee.3 The intervention of 
the administrative judge is critical be-
cause 
'it is the administrative judge who 
has an overall view of the court's 
business, who is responsible "for 
the administration of the court," 
who assigns trial judges, who "su-
pervise[s] the assignment of actions 
for trial," who supervises th<; court 
personnel involved in the assign-
ment of cases, and who receives 
reports from such personnel,' and 
'[c]onsequently the administrative 
judge is ordinarily in a much better 
position than another judge of the 
trial court, or an appellate court, to 
make the judgment as to whether 
good cause for the pos~onement of 
a criminal case exists.' 
Accordingly, the court of appeals has 
held that any procedure by which all 
trial judges are purportedly designees of 
the administrative judge, and thus au-
thorized to grant postponementsg 
would not comply with Rule 4-271.3 
Similarly, the court has held that a trial 
judge may not grant a postponement 
beyond the 180-day limit, subject to the 
approval of the administrative judge, 
when such approval takes place after 
the expiration date. 39 
More recently, the court of appeals has 
held that the circuit court's assignment 
officer may not grant a postponement 
that places ~e trial date beyond the 180-
day period. 0 The court stated that Rule 
4-271 does not "contemplate or permit 
the exercise of postponement authority 
by anyone other than one with the au-
thority of an administrative judge. ,,41 
Similarly, in State v. Robertson,42 the 
court of special appeals held that the 
requirements of Rule 4-271 are not satis-
fied when the trial court orders a case 
"out of assignment." In that case, the 
defendant failed to appear for the sched-
uled trial date because the District of 
Columbia was holding him on other 
charges, and refused to honor the 
county's writ of habeas corpus ad pro-
sequendum.43 The court, unable to pro-
ceed with the trial, ordered the clerk to 
"show [the case] out of assignment.,,44 
Six days before the expiration of the 
l8O-day period, the State requested, in 
writing, that the clerk set a new date for 
motions and trial.45 The assignment of-
fice set the trial date for three months 
after Jre expiration of the l8O-day pe-
riod. The State never sought a post-
ponement by the administrative judge or 
his or her designee during the 18().day 
period.47 The trial court dismissed the 
charges because no judge approved the 
postl?onement beyond the 18O-day pe-
riod,1I8 and the court of special appeals 
affirmed because of the State's failure JO 
comply with the Rule's reqUirements. 9 
Moreover, the court of special appeals 
recently held that a designee of an admin-
istrative judge may not further deSignate 
another judge as havin§ the authority to 
grant postponements. 5 The court noted 
that the purpose of requiring an adminis-
trative judge or his or her designee to 
make the good cause determination is to 
ensure that the decision is made by the 
person in the best position to do so.51 
The court, therefore, concluded that in 
light of this purpose and the clear and 
unambiguous language of Rule 4-271, the 
Rule contemplates but one designation 





must show good 
cause. n 
The Good Cause Requirement 
A fair reading of Rule 4-271 and the 
cases dictate that the party requesting a 
postponement beyond the l8O-day pe-
riod, whether the party is the court, the 
State, or the defendant, must show good 
cause.53 The court of appeals has ruled, 
however, that an administrative judge's 
decision to postpone a case for good 
cause need not specifically acknowledge 
that the postponement will caN the 
case beyond the 18O-day period.5 More-
over, once a case is properly postponed 
for good cause, the administrative judge 
need not personally reset or cause the 
case to be reset for a particular date but 
may delegate this responsibility to the 
assignment office.55 It must be remem-
bered, however, that once a postpone-
ment has been granted for good cause, 
the administrative judge and the prosecu-
tor are administratively responsible for 
ensuring that the postponement is not 
extended in violation of the sixth amend-
ment.56 
In the past, Maryland courts have iden-
tified a number of situations that qualify 
as good cause, many of which involve 
pretrial preparations or motions. 57 For 
example, a delay in receiving an evalua-
tion concerning the defendant's mental 
health58 or a determination that the de-
fendant is incompetent to stand trial may 
constitute good cause.59 Additionally, 
good cause may be found when a motion 
for severance is granted when only one 
defendant can be tried on schedule and 
when time is taken up on a pretrial sup-
pression motion.60 Moreover, when the 
parties are involved in bona fide plea 
bargaining, or if the defendant fails to 
comply with a valid discovery request, 
good cause may exist for a postpone-
ment on behalf of the State.61 Good cause 
may ~so exist if new evidence is discov-
ered. 2 Furthermore, although a 
defendant's need to secure counsel may 
constitute good cause, a defendant's last 
minute request to change counsel, or a 
defendant's claim that appointed coun-
sel was unprepared, does not constitute 
good cause.63 
Maryland courts have also ruled that an 
excusable failure to secure the atten-
dance of a ~y witness may constitute 
good cause. Whether such a failure 
constitutes g~od cause is analyzed under 
four criteria. 5 These criteria are: (1) the 
reasonable expectation of securing the 
witness within a reasonable time; (2) the 
competency and materiality of the prof-
fered witness; (3) the ability to try the 
case fairly without the witness; and (4) 
the exercise of reasonable diligence by 
the party requesting the postponement 
to se~re the witness prior to the trial 
date. 
Furthermore, the court of special ap-
peals has held that when a defendant 
backs out of a plea agreement on the day 
of trial and demands a jury trial, good 
cause exists for a postponement on be-
half of the State to summon witnesses 
and to ~therwise prepare for a trial on the 
merits. 7 The court has also decided that 
the denial of a request for a postpone-
ment by a defendant, whose mother was 
in a coma and was not expected to live, 
was not an abuse of discretion.68 Thus, a 
defendant's need to visit a sick relative 
may not cogstitute good cause to post-
pone a trial. 9 
The court of appeals has held that 
non-chronic court congestion may con-
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stitute good cause but chronic court con-
gestion is inexcusable.1O It has been sug-
gested that the State and the hearing 
judge present as much evidence as pos-
sible with regard to the request for a 
postponement, including live witnesses 
and court records, to show the efforts 
being made by the court and the State's 
Anomey's Office to comp-Ir with the re-
quirements of Rule 4-271.1 
Similarly, in State v. Toney,n the court 
of appeals held that the unavailability of 
a prosecutor may constitute good cause 
to warrant postponement under the 
Speedy Trial Rule when the prosecutor's 
scheduling conflicts are caused by un-
usual situations.73 The defendant was 
charged with ftrst and second degree 
murder and related weapons viola-
tions.14 The case was postponed several 
times for various reasons, including the 
unavailability of a courtroom, the late 
receipt of evidence, and the unavailabil-
ity of a judge.15 The fourth and critical 
postponement was granted because the 
prosecuto~ was trying an unrelated mur-
der case? The prosecutor argued that 
he had developed a rapport with a key 
witness and such rapport was not easily 
transferable to another prosecutor.77 
The administrative judge found good 
cause for the postponement.1S When the 
case was called for trial, and a different 
anomey represented the State, the defen-
dant moved to dismiss the charges on the 
ground that the good cause requirement 
of Rule 4-271 had not been satisfied?9 
The defendant's motion was denied.so 
The appellate court noted that the deter-
mination as to what constitutes good 
cause is a matter within the discretion of 
the administrative judge,Sl and his deter-
mination of good cause will not be re-
versed absent a showing of a clear abuse 
of discretion or a lack of good cause as a 
matter of law.s2 The court found no evi-
dence that prosecutors are habitually un-
available due to trial conflicts and thus 
determined that the administrative judge 
could have properly concluded that 
good cause existed for a postpone-
ment.S3 
In Wright v. State,84 the defendant's 
trial date was inadvertentlx set for a date 
in violation of Rule 4-271.s The prosecu-
tor discovered the violation three days 
before the l8O-day period expired and 
requested that the administrative Judge 
reset the trial for the 180th day. The 
defendant's counsel objected, stating 
that the defendant was not present and 
had not been served to appear.S7 The 
administrative judge moved the trial date 
forward and placed the burden of notify-
ing the defendant on his counsel and his 
bondsman.88 The defendant failed to ap-
pear on the new trial date and the admin-
istrative judge found good cause to 
postpone the trial date to the original trial 
date outside ofthe l8O-day period.S9 On 
that trial date, the defendant moved to 
dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 
4-271.90 The trial judge denied the mo-
tion.91 The appellate court noted that the 
State had made a good faith effort to set 
the trial in accordance with Rule 4-271 
and to notify the defendant of the change 
in the trial date.92 The court determined 
that appellant's failure to appear was not 
caused by any bad faith on the part of the 
State.93 Accordingly, the court con-




sanction for a 
violation of the. 
Rule is dismissal 
with prejudice. n 
Sanction fOt" Noncompliance 
Ordinarily, the appropriate sanction 
for a violation of the Speedy Trial Rule is 
dismissal with prejudice.95 The court of 
appeals has consistently held that the 
postponement that carries the case be-
yond the 18O-day period is the critical 
one.96 The dismissal sanction is not ap-
propriate, however, if the violation of 
Rule 4-271 is a failure to set the trial date 
within thirty days of the earlier of either 
the appearance of counsel or the first 
appearance of the defendant before the 
circuit court.97 Additionally, dismissal is 
inappropriate when the defendant seeks 
or expressly consents to a trial date in 
violation of Rule 4-271.9S 
A defendant'S motion for an extension 
of time to file an election of a court or 
jury trial, for example, was held to 
amount to seeking or expressly consent-
ing to a trial date in violation of the Rule.99 
Even if defense counsel's consent to a 
trial date beyond the l8O-day period is 
inadvertent, the dismissal sanction is not 
warranted. lOO Moreover, even though a 
defendant's request or acquiescence in a 
postponement is not automatically con-
sidered seeking or consenting to a post-
ponement in violation of the Rule, such 
action in the latter portion of the l8O-day 
period may be considered consent. lOl A 
defendant's insistence on his sixth 
amendment right to counsel on the day 
of trial, however, does not constitute 
consent. l02 However, once a defendant 
agrees to a plea bargain, there is a de facto 
"waiver" of the Rule's prompt trial pro-
visions. l03 
In State v. Brown,104 the court of ap-
peals reaffirmed its previous holding that 
when a defendant expressly and unqual-
iftedly consents to a trial date in violation 
of Rule 4-271, dismissal is an inappropri-
ate sanction. In Brown, the defendant 
ftled a document purporting to "waive" 
the requirements of the Rule. 105 The 
court noted that the Rule's requirements 
may not be waived because the Rule does 
not codify a defendant's right to a speedy 
trial; rather, it is designed to further 
society's interest in theoJ'rompt disposi-
tion of criminal trials. 1 The Rule's re-
quirements, therefore, are binding on 
both the prosecution and the defense. l07 
The court concluded, however, that 
when a defendant seeks or expressly 
consents to a date in violation of the Rule, 
as the defendant did in this case, dis-
missal is not appropriate because the 
defendant would gain an advantage by 
his own violation of the Rule. lOS 
Moreover, in Treece v. State/09 the 
court of special appeals held that when 
defense counsel enters an insanity plea 
over the objection of the defendant, and 
the critical postponement is premised on 
a joint request for mental examination, 
the defendant has sought or expressly 
consented to a trial date in violation of 
Rule 4-271. The court concluded that, 
because the decision of defense counsel 
to enter an insanity plea was amply sup-
ported, the subsequent postponement to 
conduct psychiatric examinations was 
not in violation of the Rule. 1 10 
Review of Violations of Rule 4-271 
Denial of a motion to dismiss for a 
violation of Rule 4-271 may be appealed 
only after a final judgment. III When a 
motion to dismiss is granted, however, 
the State may appeal immediateIyY2 A 
defendant need not raise the denial of the 
motion at trial in order to preserve it for 
review if he has ftled a motion to dismiss 
for a violation of Rule 4-271 and a hearing 
has been heldY3 The court of appeals 
has held that when a defendant diligently 
pursues a prompt trial, there can be no 
waiver of the issue merely because the 
hearing judge, who was also the trial 
judge, failed to put his denial of the mo-
tion on the record. 114 Because a trial 
judge has a duty to rule on all pretrial 
motions, when the matter proceeds to 
trial it can be concluded that the judge 
denied the motion and the issue is pre-
served for reviewY5 
The scope of appellate review is nar-
row. Rule 4-271 places wide discretion 
in the hands of the administrative judge 
in determining whether good cause ex-
ists to postpone a case. 1 1 Therefore, an 
appellate court, as well as a trial judge, 
may not reverse an administrative judge's 
determination of good cause absent a 
demonstration by the defendant of a 
clear abuse of discretion or a lack of good 
cause as a matter oflawY7 
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Conclusion 
In dealing with Rule 4-271, it is impor-
tant to remember that its purpose is to 
promote orderly trial procedure.118 In 
keeping with this purpose, it is reason-
able to conclude that the court will con-
tinue to rigidly adhere to the requirement 
that only an administrative judge or his 
or her designee may grant a postpone-
ment. Additionally, the court is likely to 
continue its flexible approach when de-
termining what constitutes good cause 
and whether a defendant has sought or 
expressly consented to a trial date in 
violation ofthe Rule. 
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